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Production function estimation with micro-data shows that a persistent unobserved variable 
varies within firm or plant over time but resists treatment and may cause biases. This paper 
presents an estimation model of the firm under endogenous productivity change. The model 
implies that (i) the so-far untreated effect stems from firms' planned efficiency responses to 
the competitive environment and that (ii) a suit-able proxy to productivity is investment 
interacted with a sector-level competition variable. An application to Brazilian manufacturing 
firm data shows that this proxy and multivariate extensions yield coefficient estimates with 
considerably less noise in bootstraps than alternative proxies, while reducing the difference to 
fixed-effects estimation and remedying commonly suspected biases. Whereas productivity 
change is measured consistently, scale economies are not identified when productivity and 
price are endogenous. 
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 Puzzles and discrepancies plague production function estimation with ¯rm or
plant data. Griliches and Mairesse (1998) conclude in a survey: \In empiri-
cal practice, the application of panel methods to micro-data produced rather
unsatisfactory results: low and often insigni¯cant capital coe±cients and un-
reasonably low estimates of returns to scale." At times, attempts to control for
attrition, simultaneity, and endogeneity problems aggravated rather than re-
solved these unsatisfactory ¯ndings. A prime reason appears to be that both
observed variables (such as sales, capital and employment) and unobserved
variables (such as ¯rm-level productivity and individual business prospects)
are highly persistent and correlated.
Most strikingly, empirical studies by Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) and others document that the ¯xed-e®ects estimator dis-
agrees markedly with other estimators. This indicates that a persistent shock,
itself correlated with input choices, varies within ¯rm or plant over time but
remains untreated in known estimation procedures. Similarly, Blundell and
Bond (2000) conclude that persistent input series trouble instruments in ¯rst-
di®erenced estimators, whereas lagged ¯rst di®erences in extended GMM per-
form more reasonably. At present, several proposed proxies to productivity
compete for the researcher's attention: Investments (Olley and Pakes 1996),
intermediate goods (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003) and lagged variables (Blundell
and Bond 2000), while adjustments for ¯rm survival and endogenous price also
demand inclusion. The estimation framework of the present paper synthesizes
these approaches consistently and documents that individual business prospects
and ¯rm-level responses to the competitive environment are major but so far
untreated sources of shocks that vary within ¯rm and over time.
A growing body of micro-econometric research into productivity change
provides evidence that the e±ciency of plants or ¯rms responds to competi-
tive pressure and rivaling innovations (Tybout and Westbrook 1995, Nickell
1996, Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Pavcnik 2002).1 The business literature
abounds with productivity management techniques: Terms such as supply-
chain management, group technology, and lean management including just-
in-time, kaizen, or continuous improvement may have replaced older notions
such as reorganization or re-engineering and the e±ciency-change acronyms of
the 1980s (MRP, OPT, or FMS). The idea, however, remains unaltered. In
its pursuit of e±cient business processes, good management responds to com-
petition and market conditions. In short, investment in productivity-relevant
assets is under the management's control and production function estimation
should account for it beyond endogenous exit and endogenous price.
1Some earlier studies on episodes of trade liberalization identi¯ed smaller but still de-
tectable e®ects (Tybout, Melo and Corbo 1991, Levinsohn 1993).
2The present paper advances a parsimonious q-theory model of investment
in capital and productivity-relevant assets under convex adjustment costs and
endogenous price. The resulting estimation routine employs ¯rm-level invest-
ments interacted with sector-level competition variables (such as entry bar-
riers, concentration measures or foreign market penetration) to approximate
productivity.
The estimation algorithm remedies the disturbing discrepancies to ¯rm-
¯xed e®ects. Capital coe±cients on equipment and structures, and coe±cients
on intermediate inputs, from the present estimator resemble ¯rm-¯xed e®ects
estimators. This agreement indicates that the new expectations-proxy to pro-
ductivity largely captures the ¯rm-speci¯c time-variant e®ect that used to
trouble estimation. While Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) estimates vary widely
across bootstraps, the expectations-proxy estimator proposed here yields con-
siderably less volatile estimates.
In the spirit of Olley and Pakes (OP), the complete procedure uses survival
to extract additional information on productivity and removes biases from af-
fected coe±cients by leading the properly estimated part of the production
function one period. Resulting capital coe±cients exceed the low OLS esti-
mates in about half the manufacturing sectors. So, the algorithm removes a
commonly suspected negative bias in OLS capital coe±cients. To the contrary,
the shorter LP algorithm would detect lower rather than higher capital coe±-
cients than OLS in the present data. Finally, the estimation algorithm removes
time-invariant demand components from the ¯rm-¯xed e®ect. Consequently,
productivity change is measured properly under common assumptions on price
setting behavior (Klette and Griliches 1996), endogenous productivity choice
and exit.
This \eureka" notwithstanding, some issues remain to be resolved in fu-
ture research. Unobserved but endogenous ¯nal-goods prices may continue
to confound the estimate of returns to scale and depress production coe±-
cients jointly. So, estimates of the level of scale economies are unidenti¯ed.
Furthermore, certain discrepancies between relative factor shares in ¯rm-level
expenditures and production coe±cients prevail. Firm heterogeneity may dis-
tort expenditure shares away from marginal products of the mean ¯rm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an
estimation model based on the assumption that ¯rms set investment schedules
for both physical capital and productivity-relevant assets, relegating mathe-
matical details to appendix A. The method is applied to Brazilian manu-
facturing ¯rm data, which section 2 describes. Section 3 introduces the new
proxy variable to productivity|¯rm-level investment interacted with sector-
level competition measures|, and o®ers bootstrap comparisons to alternative
3estimators. Section 4 shows that the inclusion of survival correction mitigates
a negative bias in capital coe±cients and documents that ¯xed-e®ect estimates
coincide with the new expectations-proxy estimates. Section 5 presents con-
sistent measures of productivity change, while section 6 discusses remaining
discrepancies between factor shares and expenditure shares. Section 7 con-
cludes.
1 Estimating Production Functions
Consider a ¯rm i's Cobb-Douglas production function in year t in its logarith-
mic form
zi;t = ¯L li;t + ¯K ki;t + ¯M mi;t + º!i;t, (1)
where zi;t denotes log output (de°ated sales revenues plus production for
stock), li;t is log end-of-year employment, ki;t the log capital stock, mi;t log
intermediate goods, and º!i;t represents log total factor productivity (TFP).
TFP is not observed in the data but known to and partly chosen by the ¯rm's
management.
Several biases a®ect estimates of production coe±cients in micro-data.2
First and foremost, ¯rms choose investment in ¯xed assets given their produc-
tivity. But productivity is not observable to the researcher so that its omission
causes a `transmission bias.' The present theoretical model shows that, if ¯rms
can invest both in capital goods and e±ciency-relevant aspects of their pro-
duction process, they may choose to raise or let decay capital and productivity
simultaneously. This fact can introduce a positive bias in ¯K. Second, Klette
and Griliches (1996) show that an error in production function estimates arises
from an `omitted price bias.' This problem occurs when revenue ¯gures are
used to approximate output and can result in a demand-side scaling factor
that depresses all coe±cient estimates jointly. Subsection 1.1 addresses `trans-
mission bias' and subsection 1.2 discusses `omitted price bias.' Finally, there is
a potential `selection bias.' Firms with a large capital stock are more likely to
remain in business and tolerate lower productivity levels. This can introduce a
negative bias in ¯K as Olley and Pakes (1996) show. Among other treatments,
an unbalanced panel of ¯rms should be considered.
This paper bases production function estimation on a model of the ¯rm
that features endogenous productivity change, price setting and exit. The
model gives rise to a novel set of productivity proxies|investments interacted
2Marschak and Andrews (1944) outline problems early on.
4with competition variables|, and addresses unresolved estimation issues re-
lated to unobserved time-varying within-¯rm e®ects, price setting and survival
adjustment in a single framework.
The variable ­i;t denotes the total of a ¯rm's tacit knowledge, organiza-
tional skills, and e±ciency-relevant arrangements embodied in the production
process. All of these factors contribute to a ¯rms' TFP level. They are not
transferrable from one ¯rm to another but can be accumulated within a ¯rm.
They depreciate unless cultivated with (net) investment I­
i;t. Investment I­
i;t is
chosen at the end of year t¡1 and becomes fully e®ective in t. For simplicity,
TFP is assumed to be
TFPi;t = (­i;t)
º (2)
for some coe±cient º>0. As opposed to physical capital accumulation, there








¢ ~ xi;t. (3)
The parameter ±­ expresses the depreciation rate of organizational knowledge.
The stochastic factor ~ xi;t captures a ¯rm's e±ciency and is assumed to be
uncorrelated with its past realizations and factor inputs.
Several recent empirical studies at the level of ¯rms or plants ¯nd that
product-market competition tends to instill investment in process innovations
and that it exerts discipline on managers to \trim their ¯rms' fat" (Nickell
1996, Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Pavcnik 2002). So, productivity is at least
partly under the managers' control.
These insights have implications for estimation. Appendix A develops an
according q-theory model of investments in capital and productivity with con-
vex adjustment costs, and a slight extension for managerial e®ort choice. Ta-
ble 1 presents key assumptions of the model and its implications. The table
also compares implications of the present model to those of Olley and Pakes'
(1996) framework.
A ¯rm chooses organizational investment I­
i;t = I­(Ki;t¡1;­i;t¡1;De
t¡1) as
a function of the capital stock Ki;t¡1 and the productivity level ­i;t¡1, and
depending on market expectations. The model implies that this choice is
closely related to the choice of net investment in capital goods. Let qK
i;t¡1
denote Tobin's q for physical capital and IK
i;t be net investment in capital goods
(gross investment less asset sales and retirements). Just as for investment in
e±ciency-relevant assets, physical net investment IK
i;t is chosen at the end of
year t¡1 and becomes fully e®ective in t.
By its ¯rst-order condition (A.8), organizational investment is a function








5Table 1: Components of q-Theory Model
Variable Evolution / Timing Data Olley & Pakes
State Variables





~ xi;t no Markoviana




i;t before ~ xi;t realized (based on q­
i;t¡1) no absenta
Investment IK
i;t before ~ xi;t realized (based on qK
i;t¡1) yes same
Survival Âi;t after ~ xi;t realized yes same
Labor Li;t after ~ xi;t realized yes same
Implications
Upward bias in capital coe±cient possible no
Monotonicity of ­i;t in IK
i;t holds unconditionally holds for IK
i;t > 0
aOlley and Pakes (1996) consider an exogenous Markov process of TFP beyond a ¯rm's
control. Alternatively, Ericson and Pakes (1995) allow for a binary choice of TFP improve-
ment that a®ects the Markov process. The current model allows managerial e®ort to alter
the distribution of ~ xi;t as in a standard principal-agent model. Whereas I­
i;t is observable to
a ¯rm's owner from cash °ows, managerial e®ort is not.
where Ã­ is a parameter of the adjustment cost function. Conditional on sur-









where ½i;t¡1 > 0 is a function of expected market conditions De
t¡1 and the




Using the ¯rst-order condition (A.8) for capital investment qK
i;t¡1 = 1 +
ÃKIK
















Equation (5) underlies the subsequent removal of `transmission bias' from pro-
duction coe±cients. Moreover, equation (5) also clari¯es that, under endoge-
nous productivity choice with convex adjustment costs, ­i;t monotonically in-
creases in IK
i;t for any given level of Ki;t¡1 and ­i;t¡1.
Under the alternative assumption made by Olley and Pakes (1996) that
productivity follows a Markov process beyond managerial control, monotonic-
ity only holds for IK
i;t > 0 (Pakes 1996). These assumptions have important
6implications for empirical implementation. Non-positive net investment occurs
frequently in ¯rm or plant data. The median Brazilian manufacturer between
1986 and 1998, for instance, conducts zero net investment in equipment (see
table 2) so that requiring IK
i;t > 0 for estimation results in a considerable
loss of observations. The presence of endogenous productivity choice under
convex adjustment costs, however, justi¯es the retention of observations with
non-positive net investment.
1.1 Correction for `Transmission Bias'
A transmission bias in the capital stock arises because both investment and
the exit choice are correlated with º!i;t. By (3), the log productivity index
º!i;t can be written as
º!i;t = h(I
K
i;t;ki;t;Dt) + ¯0;i + º»i;t (6)
for some function h(¢). ¯0;i is a ¯rm-speci¯c mean of productivity shocks, and
»i;t is a serially uncorrelated shock to productivity with mean zero and constant
variance across ¯rms in a sector. Both ¯0;i and »i;t are known to the ¯rm when
it chooses variable factor inputs (labor, intermediate goods) and investments
IK
i;t+1 and I­
i;t+1 for next period. While entirely known to the ¯rm's manage-
ment, º!i;t is not observable to the researcher. There is no variable for a ¯rm's
expectations but one may suppose that ¯rms are fairly well informed about
looming domestic market outcomes, especially in samples with medium-sized
to large ¯rms such as the present one. So, the vector of current market con-
ditions Dt is taken as a proxy for past expectations De
t¡1. Although di®erent
in its underlying assumptions from the model behind Olley and Pakes (1996),
the present framework of endogenous investment in productivity-relevant as-
sets suggests a structurally similar estimation approach.
The ¯rst regression equation follows by using (6) in (A.5),
zi;t = ¯0;i + ¯L li;t + ¯M mi;t + ¯K ki;t + h(I
K
i;t;ki;t;Dt) + º»i;t + ²i;t
´ ¯0;i + ¯L li;t + ¯M mi;t + Á(I
K
i;t;ki;t;Dt) + º»i;t + ²i;t. (7)
Only part of the regression equation is linear. The term Á(¢) ´ ¯K ki;t + h(¢)
arises because the e®ect of log TFP on output cannot be separated from the
e®ect of physical capital on output as long as their correlation is not removed.
The coe±cient estimates for ¯L and ¯M, on the other hand, are consistent if
Á(¢) is approximated well.
The competitive environment re°ected in Dt depends on the productivity
distribution of producers. Market concentration, government policies such as
7antitrust and tari® measures, aggregate demand, or foreign competition all
respond to the prevailing productivity distribution. To avoid simultaneity
issues from this source, I use the nominal exchange rate and foreign producer
price indices at the sector level as instrumental variables to predict foreign
competition, aggregate demand, and tari® barriers. Firms are very limited in
their ability, if not unable, to base their productivity-relevant investment on
the future exchange rate and future innovations to foreign producer costs.
Next, estimate the probability of a ¯rm's survival given today's informa-
tion. Theory predicts that survival occurs as long as the realization of »i;t
exceeds a minimal level that depends on market expectations and installed
capital so that !i;t ¸ !(ki;t;Dt) (see appendix A). The probability of survival
is derived in (A.16) in appendix A and becomes
Pr (Âi;t+1 = 1j¢) = Pr (!i;t ¸ !(ki;t;Dt)) = P(I
K
i;t;ki;t;Dt) (8)
in the present context. Equation (8) is the second estimation equation. A
probit and a logit model estimate it.
Finally, to obtain a consistent estimate of the capital coe±cient ¯K, exploit
information on the expected contribution of capital to production one period
in advance. Consider zi;t+1¡¯0;i¡¯L li;t+1¡¯M mi;t+1. Conditional on survival,
the expectation of this term is
E[zi;t+1 ¡ ¯0;i ¡ ¯L li;t+1 ¡ ¯M mi;t+1 jki;t;!i;t;Dt;Âi;t+1 = 1]
= ¯K ki;t+1 + E[!i;t+1 jki;t;!i;t;Dt;Âi;t+1 = 1]





Pr (Âi;t+1 = 1j¢)
d!i;t+1
by equations (1), (6), and (8). P(¢), a function of Dt, can approximate the
cuto® !(ki;t;Dt).3 In other words, we can view the productivity expectation
E[!i;t+1 jki;t;!i;t;Dt;Âi;t+1 = 1] as a function of !(¢) and !i;t or as a function
g (P(¢);Á(¢) ¡ ¯K ki;t). So,
zi;t+1 ¡ ¯0;i ¡ ¯L li;t+1 ¡ ¯M mi;t+1
= ¯K ki;t+1 + g (P(¢);Á(¢) ¡ ¯K ki;t) + º»i;t+1 + ²i;t+1: (9)
»i;t+1 is the unanticipated innovation in !i;t+1. Hence, it is not correlated with
net investment IK
i;t or tomorrow's log capital stock ki;t+1, and the estimate
of ¯K is consistent under the assumptions made. Equation (9) is the third
estimation equation.
3Under regularity conditions (the density of »i;t+1 needs to be positive in a neighborhood
around »i;t), !(¢) can be inverted in capital and expressed as a function of Dt and P(¢),
which is a function of Dt in turn.




n=0 ¯m;n( ^ P)m(^ h)n approxi-
mates g (P(¢);h(¢)) in equation (9). The capital coe±cient enters equation (9)
twice: in the additive terms, and through ^ h(¢) = ^ Á(¢) ¡ ¯K ki;t. I estimate the
equation with non-linear least squares, using ¯xed-e®ects estimates of equation
(7) as starting values. Subtracting the ¯xed e®ect ¯0;i from zi;t on the left hand
side reduces the ¯t in some sectors. However, the error term needs to be iden-
tically distributed for the bootstrap to follow. This requires the subtraction of
¯0;i.
1.2 Partial Correction for `Omitted Price Bias'
Production function estimation is consistent if proper quantity measures for
output and inputs can be used. However, a source of bias remains for estimates
of economies of scale if that is not the case. The bias arises because price is
unknown but endogenous in imperfectly competitive markets. Harrison (1994)
discusses the problem of markups in input prices, and Klette and Griliches
(1996) address the problem of ¯nal-goods price markups.
The total of a ¯rm's sales and production for stock, de°ated by sector-
speci¯c price indices, approximates output. So, the dependent variable in the
¯rst regression equation (7) is in fact pi;t + zi;t ¡ ¹ pt, where pi;t denotes the log
of ¯rm i's price and ¹ pt the value of the price index for de°ation. By demand
(A.3), the di®erence between a ¯rm's price and market price is pi;t ¡ ¹ pt =
¡(1 ¡ ®)di;t + (1 ¡ ®)(¹ µt ¡ ¹ pt), where ¡1=(1¡®) 2 (¡1;¡1) approximates
price elasticity of demand and ¹ µt denotes the log of market-wide demand.
Because of this relationship and since di;t = zi;t in equilibrium, the de facto
regression is
(pi;t + zi;t ¡ ¹ pt) = ®zi;t + (1 ¡ ®)(¹ µt ¡ ¹ pt)
= ®¯0;i + (1 ¡ ®)(¹ µ ¡ ¹ p) (10)
+®¯L li;t + ®¯M mi;t + ®Á(I
K
i;t;ki;t;Dt)
+(1 ¡ ®)(¢¹ µt ¡ ¢¹ pt) + ®º»i;t + ®²i;t,
rather than (7). Here, the log of market-wide demand for close substitutes (1¡
®)(¹ µt¡¹ pt) is decomposed into a preference based component (1¡®)(¹ µ¡¹ p) that
does not vary over time, and into a time-varying component (1¡®)(¢¹ µt¡¢¹ pt)
that moves with the market conditions and the business cycle (¢¹ µt ´ ¹ µt ¡ ¹ µ
and ¢¹ pt ´ ¹ pt ¡ ¹ p).
The demand-side parameter ® confounds the estimate of returns to scale by
appearing in front of zi;t. Klette and Griliches (1996) propose to use the sum of
all ¯rms' sales to approximate market-wide demand and to include it explicitly
in the regression.Their purpose is to correct the scale estimate. Here, however,
9the focus lies on endogenous productivity choice, and there are theoretical and
practical reasons not to use Klette and Griliches' full correction but rather
only a ¯xed-e®ects variant. The present estimation framework implies that the
¯xed-e®ects estimator ®¯0;i+(1¡®)(¹ µ¡ ¹ p) absorbs the time-invariant demand
component ¹ µ and that the time-varying demand component ¢¹ µt becomes part
of the expectations proxy ®Á(IK
i;t;ki;t;Dt) + (1¡®)(¢¹ µt ¡ ¢¹ pt).
A ¯rm's investment in e±ciency-relevant assets !i;t depends on market
expectations (see (A.2) and (A.10)) in appendix A). Similarly, the contractable
e±ciency choice of a manager depends on market conditions (A.18). If these
market expectations are rational and ¯rms are able to anticipate demand well,
the coe±cient on log sector-wide demand, which is part of the vector Dt, will
capture e±ciency choice rather than the omitted price e®ect.
Interpreting the coe±cient on sector-wide demand as a mere measure of
the demand elasticity, and taking equation (10) at face value, implies that
the predicted e®ect of de°ated sector-wide demand (1¡®)(¢¹ µt ¡ ¢¹ pt) should
be removed from ¯rm-level productivity estimates. Estimation in section 4
shows, however, that the coe±cient on log aggregate demand would imply
an unreasonably small demand elasticity ¡1=(1¡®) in most sectors. In fact,
coe±cient estimates imply 1¡® > 1 but ® > 0, an impossibility. Conversely,
this ¯nding indicates that market expectations can go a long way in explaining
productivity choice. The coe±cient estimate for (1¡®) likely captures both
the price elasticity of demand and the e®ect of current demand on realizations
of productivity choice.
The present estimation framework addresses endogenous investment in
productivity-relevant assets. Up to a correction factor for scale economies,
unbiased production function coe±cients result and consistent measures of
¯rm-level TFP change can be inferred.
2 Data
The Brazilian statistical bureau IBGE surveys manufacturing ¯rms and plants
annually in its Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA). Firm data arguably re°ect un-
observed characteristics and inputs such as managerial ability and e®ort more
closely than do plant data. So, ¯rm data are used here. The ¯rm sample from
1986 to 1995 (with the year 1991 missing due to a federal austerity program),
and its extension through 1998, is representative for medium-sized to large
manufacturing companies but not necessarily for the Brazilian manufacturing
sector as a whole. This section summarizes data characteristics and highlights
elements of the panel construction. Appendix B provides a brief description
10of the statistical bureau's sampling method.4
The present analysis mostly compares the ¯ve sectors with the largest num-
ber of ¯rm-year observations at n¶ ³vel 50: (08) Machinery, equipment and in-
stallations; (14) Wood sawing, wood products and furniture; (22) Textiles;
(26) Plant product processing (including rice and wheat milling, fruit and
vegetable processing, and tobacco); and (31) Other food and beverage man-
ufacturing (including animal feeds, other food and beverage manufacturing).
Since sectors 26 and 31 embrace a diverse group of manufacturers, less em-
phasis will be put on production function estimates for those. Together, the
¯ve largest sectors comprise 21,465 ¯rm-year observations of the total 60,656
observations. To infer ¯rm-level productivity and its evolution in section 5, I
estimate production functions for all 27 manufacturing sectors at n¶ ³vel 50.
PIA o®ers precise longitudinal information for every ¯rm. Special vari-
ables summarize a ¯rm's state of operation and make sure that observations
with missing economic information are not confounded with shutdown or tem-
porary suspension of production. Brazilian manufacturers between 1986 and
1998 \mothball" for extended periods of time. Among the 9,500 ¯rms with
valid observations, more than 1,100 state in at least one year that they sus-
pended production temporarily or for the entire year. This information o®ers
an appropriate survival indicator, as distinct from a non-missing indicator, for
the estimation procedure.
Economic variables in PIA include sales ¯gures and changes in ¯nal goods
stocks, costs of inputs, salaries, employment of blue- and white-collar workers,
and several variables related to investment and the capital stock. Firms in
PIA also report their acquisitions of foreign equipment until 1995 and their
purchases of foreign intermediate goods since 1996. Output and domestic
inputs are de°ated with sector-speci¯c wholesale price indices. Capital stock
¯gures and investments are de°ated with economy-wide wholesale price indices.
There is no producer price index for Brazil. A perpetual inventory method,
which controls for changes to accounting law in 1991, yields the overall capital
stock.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the ¯ve largest sectors. A sizable
number of observations exhibits missing values for several variables. Except for
intermediate steps in the perpetual inventory method for capital stock ¯gures,
no variables are imputed.
Sector classi¯cations in PIA would allow for the estimation of production
functions at a level that corresponds to three ISIC rev. 3 digits (n¶ ³vel 100).
However, large ¯rms in PIA are likely to o®er product ranges beyond nar-
4Muendler (2003) documents the construction of an unbalanced ¯rm panel from PIA in
detail.
11Table 2: Summary Statistics for largest five sectors
Mean S.dev. Median Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output 26.412 66.955 7.060 21,465
Value added 15.196 42.967 3.529 19,933
Total employment 677.266 1,102.038 300 17,362
Blue-collar employment 468.528 3,077.856 176 20,894
White-collar employment 164.808 373.944 50 17,574
Total capital 14.404 41.604 3.374 17,912
Equipment 4.367 13.145 .760 17,923
Structures 10.027 34.495 2.273 17,927
Intermediate goods 12.572 33.258 2.836 20,862
Total investment 1.540 9.521 .046 20,118
Equipment investment .508 4.653 0 20,118
Structures investment 1.032 7.715 .019 20,118
Foreign equipment share .023 .098 0 18,800
Foreign intm. goods share .013 .073 0 24,123
Foreign market penetration .049 .056 .026 24,661
Nominal tari® .352 .246 .257 24,661
Aggregate demand 10,196.940 3,329.918 10,563.770 24,661
Data: Pesquisa Industrial Annual 1986-1998 from sectors (08) Machinery, (14) Wood and
furniture, (22) Textiles, (26) Plant products, (31) Other food and beverages.
Economic ¯gures in million Reais, August 1994; employment in number of persons; foreign
input shares, market penetration and tari®s as fractions.
rowly de¯ned sector limits. Data at more aggregate levels also provide more
variation in the cross section because variables related to the market environ-
ment become available for two or more subsectors within several sectors. Those
variables provide identi¯cation. Moreover, switching from the three to the two-
digit level increases the number of observations per estimation considerably.
So, I carry out estimation at two ISIC3 digits (n¶ ³vel 50).
3 Comparisons to Alternative Estimators
Among the estimators typically employed in production function estimation
are OLS, ¯xed e®ects, instrumental variable estimators, and the Olley and
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimators in the presence or
absence of observations with non-positive investment. Firm- or plant-level
studies show, for the most part, that the ¯xed-e®ects estimator exhibits the
12starkest di®erences to alternative estimators. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
for instance, document for a sample of Chilean manufacturing plants in four
sectors: \The ¯xed e®ects estimator is in the most pronounced disagreement
with other estimators as it rejects compatibility with every other estimator
in every industry at the 1% level of signi¯cance. Previous results suggest the
existence of a persistent shock which is highly correlated with input choices.
This results says that this persistent shock seems to vary within-¯rm over
time."
Firm-level expectations about individual business prospects and possible re-
sponses to the competitive market environment lie behind the persistent shock
which varies within ¯rms and over time. Firm-level net capital investment
interacted with a sector-level competition variable (such as foreign market
penetration) is a leading candidate to capture a ¯rm's individual market ex-
pectations and to correct for `transmission bias.' To establish this proxy vari-
able, the present section compares the use of ¯rm-level investment interacted
with sector-level competition (as proposed here) to intermediate inputs (as
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin 2003) and to the OLS estimator. To focus
the comparison, I use the shorter Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) correction al-
gorithm in this section. The extended Olley and Pakes (1996) approach and a
comparison to ¯xed e®ects estimation is deferred to the following section 4.
Instead of approximating ¯rm-level productivity through a polynomial in
covariates as in equation (7), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) regress the output
variable and all input variables that are supposedly una®ected by `transmission
bias' on intermediate goods (the proxy variable) and the capital stock. They
subtract the predictions from the observed variables and run the according
short regression of the production function
zi;t ¡ ^ zi;t = ¯bl (l
bl
i;t ¡ ^ l
bl
i;t) + ¯wh (l
wh
i;t ¡ ^ l
wh
i;t ) + ²i;t; (11)
where variables with hats denote predictions from a linear regression on mi;t
and ki;t. Labor is split into blue-collar and white-collar employment to improve
the ¯t.
To obtain consistent coe±cient estimates for intermediate inputs and cap-
ital, according moment conditions can be applied: Under the assumptions
made, productivity shocks are orthogonal to the current capital stock and
lagged variable inputs (intermediate goods, labor). The correlation between
the unpredictable part of productivity ( d º!i;t(· ¯M; · ¯K) = zi;t¡ b ¯bl lbl
i;t¡ ^ ¯wh lwh
i;t ¡
· ¯M mi;t ¡ · ¯K ki;t from the ¯rst stage) and the current capital stock or any
lagged variable input is conditioned to be zero. The according GMM estima-
13Di®erences: Expectation Proxy and Levinsohn-Petrin estimates
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º»i;t(· ¯M; · ¯K) ¢ vh;i;t
!2
(12)
over estimates of ¯M and ¯K, where the counter h in vh;i;t stands for the four
variables ki;t;mi;t¡1;lbl
i;t¡1 and lwh
i;t¡1. Starting values for · ¯ and · ¯ are estimates
from the ^ zi;t regression at the outset of the ¯rst step. Non-linear least squares
are used for the GMM iteration.
A preferable alternative single-variable proxy for productivity, instead of
mi;t, is ¯rm-level investment IK
i;t interacted with some current sector-level com-
petition variable Di;t such as, for instance, foreign market penetration (the
following section 4 presents multivariate proxies). Under similar theoretical
assumptions to those underlying the moment condition Et¡1 [º!i;t ¢ mi;t¡1] = 0,
investment IK
i;t chosen at the end of t¡1 (or during t) and e®ective by the end of






14Table 3: Comparison among Alternative Production Function Es-
timates
Exp. Proxy LP OLS
Coef. SEa Coef. SEa Coef. SEa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(08) Machinery
Blue-collar labor .251 .031 .254 .033 .221 .041
White-collar labor .303 .024 .287 .025 -.008 .027
Intermediate goods .372 .022 8.21e-06 .212 .605 .03
Capital .143 .055 .373 .239 .376 .033
Inv. * For. penetr. 3.00e-07 7.80e-07
Obs. 2,622 2,694 2,694
(14) Wood and furniture
Blue-collar labor .376 .025 .365 .026 .364 .034
White-collar labor .216 .02 .199 .018 -.083 .027
Intermediate goods .34 .019 .087 .17 .616 .026
Capital .00002 .019 .213 .103 .334 .023
Inv. * For. penetr. 1.00e-05 .0003
Obs. 2,723 2,835 2,835
(22) Textiles
Blue-collar labor .264 .027 .281 .023 .224 .032
White-collar labor .219 .023 .203 .021 -.061 .023
Intermediate goods .462 .024 .124 .077 .679 .023
Capital .068 .198 .197 .056 .31 .024
Inv. * For. penetr. 7.63e-08 .003
Obs. 3,190 3,258 3,258
(26) Plant products
Blue-collar labor .256 .023 .211 .022 .288 .033
White-collar labor .238 .021 .228 .019 -.092 .025
Intermediate goods .378 .025 .655 .208 .549 .027
Capital .112 .061 2.22e-28 .187 .449 .026
Inv. * For. penetr. 8.52e-07 5.14e-07
Obs. 2,734 2,764 2,764
(31) Other food and beverages
Blue-collar labor .275 .022 .232 .023 .221 .03
White-collar labor .229 .02 .21 .021 -.029 .023
Intermediate goods .34 .021 .557 .23 .608 .025
Capital .184 .03 .06 .148 .391 .025
Inv. * For. penetr. 2.31e-07 2.09e-07
Obs. 3,335 3,431 3,431
aBased on 50 bootstraps.
15Di®erences: Expectation Proxy and Levinsohn-Petrin estimates
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Data: Pesquisa Industrial Annual 1986-1998. Estimates from 50 bootstraps.
Figure 2: Bootstrapped white-collar labor coe±cients
To avoid a simultaneity problem from the fact that sector-level competition
responds to the prevailing productivity, the nominal exchange rate and foreign
producer price indices at the sector level serve as instrumental variables to
predict foreign market penetration|the sector-level competition variable used
here. For ¯rms, moves in the nominal exchange rate and innovations in foreign
producer costs are largely unforeseeable at the time of their investment in
productivity-relevant assets. So, instrumented foreign market penetration ^ Di;t
is uncorrelated with º!i;t. In short, Et¡1[º!i;t ¢ IK
i;t ^ Di;t] = 0. Purely domestic
competition variables, such as Her¯ndahl indices of industry concentration for
instance, are arguably less akin to instrumentation and therefore omitted.
Table 3 presents the results. Although the coe±cient on the single expec-
tations proxy, investment interacted with foreign market penetration, is not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, the use of the proxy yields plausible results
for the actual production function coe±cients. (The use of multiple proxies in
the next section leads to signi¯cance of several proxies, see table 5.) The fact
16Di®erences: Expectation Proxy and OLS estimates
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Figure 3: Bootstrapped capital coe±cients
that the expectations proxy receives only a very small coe±cient estimate is
encouraging: Coe±cients on physical factor inputs account for almost all of
the variation in output, the proxy does not take away from that, while still
clearing the coe±cient estimates of `transmission bias.'
The di®erences between OLS, Levinsohn and Petrin (LP), and expectations
proxy estimation suggest underlying biases that are consistent with the gen-
erally asserted productivity experience of the Brazilian manufacturing sector.
Figures 1 through 4 display histograms of di®erences between coe±cient esti-
mates from 50 bootstraps. The ¯gures compare the frequencies of di®erences
across the three production function estimators for the machinery (08) and the
wood and furniture (14) sectors. In general, the shape of the distributions cor-
roborates the ¯ndings that table 3 suggests: All three estimators largely agree
on the blue-collar labor coe±cient, only OLS suggests implausible negative
coe±cients on white-collar labor, both expectations-proxy and LP estimation
suggest lower capital and intermediate goods coe±cients than OLS. However,
17Di®erences: Expectation Proxy and OLS estimates
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Figure 4: Bootstrapped intermediate goods coe±cients
expectations proxy estimation yields sharper and less volatile estimates than
LP. I discuss the likely reasons in turn.
Figures 1 and 2 show that neither the blue-collar nor the white-collar la-
bor coe±cients di®er between the expectations proxy estimation and the LP
estimation. Wald tests on the coe±cients in table 3 con¯rm for four out of ¯ve
sectors (sector 26 being the exception) that labor coe±cients coincide under
expectations proxy and LP estimation. Also, the OLS coe±cient estimate for
blue-collar labor mostly coincides with the other two estimates. However, the
OLS coe±cient on white-collar labor would yield an implausible negative co-
e±cient. The reason is likely that white-collar labor was valuable during the
period of macroeconomic instability until around 1994, when production e±-
ciency was low but ¯nancial operations and skillful accounting would mitigate
or even exploit the otherwise adverse e®ects of hyperin°ation. As prices stabi-
lized and foreign competition intensi¯ed, manufacturers raised their productiv-
ity and shed white-collar labor that was no longer needed for core operations.
18As a consequence of this experience, we can expect white-collar employment
to be negatively related to productivity in Brazilian manufacturing during the
1990s.
The bootstraps show for capital coe±cients that, in four out of ¯ve sec-
tors, both the expectations proxy estimator and the LP estimator yield lower
capital coe±cients than OLS regressions. Figure 3 also illustrates that the
expectations proxy estimator yields sharper and less volatile estimates. Taken
at face value, the OLS estimator seems to su®er from a positive rather than
an often suspected negative bias. A positively biased OLS capital coe±cient
is also found in other data (Mairesse and Hall 1996, Pavcnik 2002, Levinsohn
and Petrin 2003) under alternative estimation methods. The proposed theo-
retical framework of simultaneous capital and productivity choice highlights
precisely the likely positive bias in the capital coe±cient. When an individual
¯rm expects particularly favorable business prospects, it will invest both in a
larger equipment stock and higher process e±ciency.
The next section 4, however, will show that correcting for survival in the
style of Olley and Pakes frequently turns the apparently positive bias in OLS
estimates into a negative bias. Capital-rich ¯rms are more likely to survive an
adverse productivity shock so that there is a negative `transmission bias' in
capital coe±cients among survivors. This suggests that the inclusion of sur-
vival estimation in the Olley and Pakes (1996) algorithm, which Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) omit, tends to leave the problem of negative biases in capital coef-
¯cients unresolved. Table 6 shows that the OLS equipment coe±cient exhibits
a negative bias in two out of ¯ve sectors (14, 26) and that the OLS structures
coe±cient has a negative bias in three out of ¯ve sectors (08, 14, 22). The
reason is that exiting ¯rms have lower productivity and lower capital stocks,
introducing an arti¯cial negative correlation between capital and productivity
among survivors.
Finally, coe±cients on intermediate goods exhibit a very similar pattern
to the capital coe±cients. Both the expectations proxy estimator and the LP
estimator yield lower intermediate goods coe±cients than OLS regressions.
Again, ¯gure 4 illustrates that the expectations proxy estimator yields sharper
and less volatile estimates. The revealed positive bias in OLS estimates likely
stems from the fact that ¯rms that engage in outsourcing to a larger degree
also tend to be the more e±cient ¯rms. Outsourcing (terceiriza» c~ ao) became
a widely discussed and often pursued business strategy during the 1990s in
Brazil. As opposed to the capital coe±cients, where the complete Olley and
Pakes algorithm yields di®erent assessments of the OLS bias, the bias in the
intermediate-goods coe±cient is found to be the same. Table 6 shows that the
OLS intermediate-goods coe±cient exhibits a positive bias in all ¯ve sectors.
19To conclude, the new single-variable proxy to productivity|¯rm-level in-
vestment interacted with sector-level competition|yields similar but sharper
and less volatile estimates than the alternative Levinsohn and Petrin proxy
(intermediate goods). This establishes the expectations proxy as a viable al-
ternative. Its main bene¯t, however, is documented in the following section.
The extended Olley and Pakes estimates under the new proxy resembles ¯xed-
e®ects estimates. This agreement indicates that the new expectations-proxy
to productivity largely captures the ¯rm-speci¯c time-variant e®ect that used
to trouble estimation.
4 Complete Production Function Estimation
The preceding section documents that ¯rm-level investment interacted with
sector-level competition does well as an expectations proxy variable, and can
improve the precision of estimates over alternative proxies. However, the
Levinsohn and Petrin algorithm neglects the information from survival and
exiting behavior. But the observation of survival reveals important informa-
tion on a ¯rm. In fact, the present section shows that the detected bias in OLS
capital coe±cients is more frequently negative under the survival-adjusting Ol-
ley and Pakes algorithm, whereas the shorter Levinsohn and Petrin algorithm
in the previous section would mostly ¯nd a surprising positive bias. Most
importantly, however, the Olley and Pakes estimates under the new proxy re-
semble or even coincide with ¯xed-e®ects estimates. So, the use of ¯rm-level
investment interacted with sector-level competition as a proxy to productivity
arguably removes the ¯rm-speci¯c time-variant e®ect that used to confound
estimation.
Both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) base their
latter-step estimation on the condition that productivity innovation is orthog-
onal to current capital input and lagged intermediate goods inputs. In addi-
tion, Olley and Pakes (1996) explicitly use survival information to conduct the
latter-step corrections (equations (8) and (9)) in their procedure. The present
framework of endogenous productivity choice is more akin to the use of invest-
ment as a proxy variable and to the explicit inclusion of survival probabilities
in the estimation.
Production function (1) is augmented to account for all factors that are
available in the data and estimated for 27 sectors under the restriction that
factor elasticities are constant between 1986 and 1998. The ¯rst regression
20equation is
zi;t = ¯0;i + ¯M mi;t + ¯bl l
bl











i;t;Dt) + »i;t + ²i;t (13)
similar to (7). It is a linear ¯rm-¯xed e®ects regression. Capital is decomposed
into equipment ki;t and structures si;t, and so is net investment (IK
i;t;IS
i;t). ai;t








Variables Dt that characterize a ¯rm's competitive environment (foreign
market penetration, the economy-wide real exchange rate, nominal tari®s, ag-
gregate demand and the annual in°ation rate) partly approximate investments
in productivity-relevant assets. The interaction of these variables with the
¯rms' physical investment in equipment and structures is intended to capture
both general business prospects and the ¯rms' individual expectations about
them. To avoid a simultaneity problem from the fact that market conditions
Dt respond to prevailing productivity, the nominal exchange rate and foreign
producer price indices at the sector level serve as instrumental variables to
predict foreign market penetration and nominal tari®s. To ¯rms, moves in the
nominal exchange rate and innovations in foreign producer costs are largely
unforeseeable at the time of their investment in productivity-relevant assets.
To minimize problems of measurement error in inputs, the shares of foreign
equipment ·
f
i;t and foreign intermediate inputs ¹
f
i;t are regressors in Á(¢). The
variable ·f is available for 1986 through 1995, and ¹f from 1996 to 1998.
Neither year dummies nor time trend variables were signi¯cant when included.
These ¯ndings lend support to the assertion that the drop in the sample in
1996 does not a®ect productivity estimates.
Next, the probability of a ¯rm's survival is estimated given current infor-
mation. This probability is given by (8)|based on (A.16) in appendix A|and
becomes





in the present context. I estimate two independent logit and probit functions
for the pre-1991 data and for the post-1991 data, taking into account that the
shutdown probabilities may have changed systematically after trade liberaliza-
tion. Contrary to the general ¯nding that time indicators are not signi¯cant,




5No survival probability can be estimated for 1991 but is needed on the third step. In
order not to lose all 1992 observations, I impute the survival probability in 1991 as the
unweighted average of the 1989, 1990, and 1992 predictions for each ¯rm.
21Table 4: Observed and Predicted Survival
Mean S.dev. Correlation coe®.
Survv.b Probitb Logitb
Survival, overalla .970 .172
Survival, estimation sampleb .994 .075 1.000
Probit predictionb .973 .120 .249 1.000
Logit predictionb .973 .122 .256 .902 1.000
a68,984 observations
b48,697 observations
Table 4 shows that both the probit and the logit model predict slightly
too few exits as compared to the data, and exhibit more dispersion. Financial
variables of the ¯rm such as its debt composition turn out to reduce the ¯t
of the logit and probit models and are left out. Including the vector of mar-
ket environment variables Dt improves the correlation between probabilities
(between zero and one) and observed outcomes (either zero or one). The cor-
relation coe±cient increases from .211 to .249 in the case of probit and from
.223 to .256 under logit. The logit model slightly outperforms probit in the
estimation sample of all 27 sectors and is kept subsequently.
A third-order polynomial expansion approximates g (P(¢);h(¢)) in equation
(9) and gives rise to the estimation equation
zi;t+1 ¡ ^ ¯0;i ¡ ^ ¯bl l
bl
i;t+1 ¡ ^ ¯wh l
wh
i;t+1 ¡ ^ ¯¹ ¹
f
i;t+1 ¡ ^ ¯M mi;t+1 (15)
= ¯· ·
f








Non-linear least squares are applied, using the ¯xed-e®ects estimates as start-
ing values.
Table 5 lists production function estimates for the ¯ve largest sectors in
¯rm-year observations (among the total of 27 sectors). The extended Olley
and Pakes (EOP) procedure is demanding on the data. The number of usable
observations can be considerably less than initial observation counts (particu-
larly striking are sectors 14 and 22). Including a multi-variate set of expecta-
tion proxies|individual investment, market environment variables, and their
interactions|results in signi¯cant coe±cients on a number of those proxies in
several sectors.
Table 6 contrasts key estimates from the extended Olley and Pakes (EOP)
procedure with ¯xed-e®ect regressions, an alternative estimation method under
22Table 5: Production Function Estimates
Wood & Plant Food &
Machinery furniture Textiles products beverages
(08) (14) (22) (26) (31)
Log blue-coll. empl. .396 .426 .396 .347 .386
(.025) (.026) (.025) (.021) (.029)
Log white-coll. empl. .23 .156 .15 .219 .195
(.018) (.014) (.018) (.017) (.016)
Log equipment .013 .175 .03 .081 .066
(.016) (.019) (.016) (.018) (.014)
Log structures .077 .06 .079 .058 .039
(.017) (.016) (.016) (.023) (.013)
Log intermediates .228 .229 .322 .244 .211
(.015) (.013) (.019) (.013) (.012)
Net equipment inv. 1.00e-05 -.00003 6.46e-06 8.22e-06 5.68e-06
(1.00e-05) (.00004) (1.00e-05) (.00003) (.00002)
Net structures inv. -7.64e-06 4.33e-06 -7.89e-06 6.13e-06 .00002
(1.00e-05) (.00002) (5.73e-06) (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05)
Foreign market pen. -391.252 -529.533 1008.876 85.044 -1945.13
(713.367) (306.53) (419.31) (305.721) (547.761)
Nominal tari® -19.154 -50.555 97.281 14.023 -193.01
(74.215) (30.249) (41.34) (30.431) (54.776)
Log aggr. demand 307.473 137.578 289.411 65.781 -115.13
(95.159) (47.621) (66.741) (69.821) (80.881)
Eqpm.inv. * For.pen. -2.47e-07 -1.29e-06 -2.46e-07 -8.12e-07 5.94e-08
(1.01e-06) (1.63e-06) (8.45e-07) (6.88e-07) (1.05e-06)
Eqpm.inv. * Tari® 2.27e-08 -2.17e-07 1.73e-08 1.01e-07 7.08e-09
(1.04e-07) (3.45e-07) (5.90e-08) (1.70e-07) (1.19e-07)
Struct.inv. * For.pen. 1.13e-07 -5.06e-07 -6.11e-07 -1.64e-08 -7.71e-07
(6.25e-07) (6.51e-07) (4.55e-07) (4.10e-07) (3.82e-07)
Struct.inv. * Tari® 7.56e-08 3.75e-08 3.58e-08 1.36e-07 1.48e-08
(5.16e-08) (1.85e-07) (3.87e-08) (6.78e-08) (3.80e-08)
For. eqpm. share .073 -.299 .138 -.243 -.044
(.099) (.071) (.043) (.101) (.086)
For. intm. share .114 .262 -.532 -.223 -.129
(.575) (.239) (.277) (.21) (.268)
Obs. 2,695 2,835 3,260 2,764 3,432
Obs. step 1 (eq. 13) 2,528 598 609 2,382 2,622
Obs. step 3 (eq. 15) 1,890 470 290 1,808 1,991
Data: Pesquisa Industrial Annual 1986-1998. Standard errors from 200 bootstraps.
Not reported: Log age, real exchange rate, in°ation rate, higher-order polynomial terms.
23Table 6: Comparison of Production Function Estimates
EOP FE OLS
Coef. S.err.a Coef. S.err. Coef. S.err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(08) Machinery
Log blue-coll. empl. .396 .025 .439 .017 .243 .014
Log white-coll. empl. .230 .018 .238 .016 .319 .014
Equipment .013 .016 .013 .015 .069 .009
Structures .077 .017 .077 .014 .053 .011
Log intermediates .228 .015 .244 .010 .365 .010
(14) Wood and furniture
Log blue-coll. empl. .426 .026 .563 .018 .367 .015
Log white-coll. empl. .156 .014 .165 .015 .216 .013
Equipment .178 .019 .178 .015 .085 .010
Structures .060 .016 .060 .015 .039 .010
Log intermediates .229 .013 .232 .010 .335 .009
(22) Textiles
Log blue-coll. empl. .396 .025 .473 .015 .256 .012
Log white-coll. empl. .150 .018 .177 .015 .209 .012
Equipment .030 .016 .030 .013 .041 .008
Structures .080 .016 .080 .012 .042 .009
Log intermediates .322 .019 .311 .009 .457 .008
(26) Plant products
Log blue-coll. empl. .347 .021 .395 .018 .25 .015
Log white-coll. empl. .219 .017 .238 .017 .243 .014
Equipment .084 .018 .084 .016 .055 .011
Structures .057 .023 .057 .015 .126 .012
Log intermediates .244 .013 .230 .009 .385 .008
(31) Other food and beverages
Log blue-coll. empl. .386 .029 .490 .016 .273 .013
Log white-coll. empl. .195 .016 .209 .013 .229 .011
Equipment .068 .014 .068 .014 .085 .010
Structures .038 .013 .038 .012 .081 .011
Log intermediates .211 .012 .179 .008 .338 .008
aEstimates from 200 bootstraps
24the behavioral assumptions but usually the most strikingly di®erent estimator.
Most importantly, capital coe±cients on equipment and structures coincide for
the EOP and the ¯xed-e®ects estimators (FE). When using the expectations
proxy variables and ¯rm-¯xed e®ects on step 1 of EOP, the subsequent step 3
procedure of EOP con¯rms the initial capital coe±cient estimates from the
¯xed-e®ects estimation (for the ¯ve select sectors, di®erences only occur past
the third digit). This agreement between EOP and FE estimates seems to
indicate that the expectations proxy variables to productivity largely capture
the ¯rm-speci¯c time-variant e®ect that several prior studies detected.
Among the ¯ve select sectors, the OLS equipment coe±cients appear to
su®er from a negative bias in 2 out of ¯ve cases, with a signi¯cantly lower
OLS coe±cient than the EOP coe±cient in 1 out of ¯ve cases (one-sided t
tests). The OLS structures coe±cients exhibit a negative bias in 3 out of ¯ve
cases, with signi¯cantly lower OLS coe±cients than the EOP coe±cient in one
case.6 Contrary to the shorter Levinsohn and Petrin procedure, the complete
algorithm of this section explicitly controls for survival and detects a negative
bias in several OLS coe±cients. Capital-rich ¯rms are willing to bear worse
productivity shocks and stay in business. This introduces a negative bias that
may lie behind the low OLS capital coe±cients in micro data.
Foreign market penetration might induce surviving ¯rms to raise productiv-
ity in order to compete, suggesting a positive coe±cient in an output regression
on market penetration, whereas tari® protection would reduce the incentives
to raise productivity, resulting in a negative coe±cient. However, the coef-
¯cients on foreign market penetration and nominal tari®s do not exhibit a
uniform pattern in table 5. Sector-speci¯c production estimation implies that
only time variation identi¯es these coe±cients. Coe±cient estimates on foreign
input shares are partly signi¯cant, but unexpectedly negative in some sectors.
The mean ¯rm in those sectors seems to fail in putting the foreign inputs to a
su±ciently productive use. Muendler (2004) conducts a more detailed analysis
of these covariates.
The coe±cients on aggregate demand in table 5 are positive and mostly
signi¯cant, indicating a procyclical component in the output measure. This
component can be related to productivity but may partly be due to varying
markups. Section 1.2 discusses a partial treatment of potential time-invariant
markups following Klette and Griliches (1996), and the following section 5
applies the treatment to ¯rm-level productivity estimates. Section 6 discusses
the relationship to markups in ¯nal-goods prices and to scale economies.
6The OLS equipment coe±cients show a negative (signi¯cantly negative) bias in 13 (6) out
of 27 sectors in total; and the OLS structures coe±cients a negative (signi¯cantly negative)
bias in 11 (3) out of 27 sectors in total.
25In summary, the Olley and Pakes algorithm and the use of ¯rm-level invest-
ments interacted with sector-level competition measures as proxies to produc-
tivity choice yield estimates that resemble or even coincide with ¯xed-e®ects
estimates. So, competition measures joined by ¯rm-level investment arguably
remove the ¯rm-speci¯c time-variant e®ect that used to distort production
function estimates. Moreover, while the shorter Levinsohn and Petrin algo-
rithm in the previous section 3 had apparently detected surprising positive
biases in OLS capital coe±cients, the extended Olley and Pakes algorithm
tends to ¯nd, and mitigate, a negative bias in OLS capital coe±cients.
5 Inference of Firm-level Productivity Change
Given production function estimates under endogenous productivity and en-
dogenous output price, the logarithm of total factor productivity at the ¯rm
level lnTFPi;t = ¯0;i + º»i;t + ²i;t becomes





i;t + ^ ¯wh l
wh
i;t + ^ ¯K ki;t + ^ ¯S si;t + ^ ¯M mi;t
´
,
by (10), where yi;t = (pi;t ¡ ¹ pt) + zi;t denotes the total of de°ated sales and
production for store. The term (1¡®)(¹ µt ¡ ¹ pt) is the average ¯rm-¯xed e®ect
¯0;i from production function estimates (13). It corrects for sector-speci¯c and
time-invariant demand-side e®ects that a®ect productivity estimates through
price pi;t in yi;t (Klette and Griliches 1996, see section 1.2). Due to monopolistic
competition, the time-invariant demand-side parameter ® (where ¡1=(1¡®) is
price elasticity of demand) scales the ¯rm-speci¯c productivity level lnTFPi;t
up or down. This scaling parameter, however, does not impair the calculation
of ¯rm-speci¯c or sector-wide productivity changes. So, no further treatments
are needed to infer productivity change.
Since ¯rm-¯xed e®ects ¯0;i ¡ ¯0;i beyond sector-wide e®ects ¯0;i would not
capture any of the time varying distortions from markups, quality or varieties
but would remove ¯rm-speci¯c productivity advantages, I do not subtract ¯rm-
¯xed e®ects from log TFP. Whether or not ¯rm-¯xed e®ects are removed,
all time-varying price-related distortions to the productivity measure remain
untreated. In particular, equation (16) implies that the sector-wide and ¯rm-
speci¯c markup (1=®) lowers the ¯rm-level productivity estimates. Moreover,
the quality of output and the number of varieties that multi-product ¯rms
produce are unobserved. Both quality and variety increase the ¯rm-¯xed e®ect
¯0;i if they are speci¯c to the ¯rm and time-invariant (Melitz 2000). In this
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Data: Firm-level productivity in 27 manufacturing sectors in PIA from EOP esti-
mates, compared to Log TFP estimates by Bugarin, Ellery Jr., Gomes and Teixeira
(2002).
Figure 5: Log TFP and labor productivity in manufacturing
regard, the present productivity measure enfolds quality. So, ¯rm-¯xed e®ects,
beyond sector-wide e®ects, are a part of ¯rm-level log TFP.
Figure 5 illustrates how TFP evolves in the aggregate of all 27 manufac-
turing sectors between 1986 and 1998. The year 1986 is re-based to unity for
each sector so that any time-invariant demand-side scale e®ects due to monop-
olistic competition are removed.7 Except for a larger drop during the recession
in the late eighties and the subsequent recovery, changes are small in general.
At its trough, log TFP drops to .981 in 1990, but recovers and reaches 1.028
by 1998, roughly a ¯ve-percent increase over 8 years. Bugarin et al. (2002)
report similar, though more volatile aggregate TFP ¯gures for Brazilian in-
dustry. Cavalcanti Ferreira and Rossi (2003) ¯nd no productivity drop during
the 1988-90 recession and a more pronounced labor productivity increase dur-







where the weights µs;t denote sector s' share of output in total output at time t, and ¾i;t the
share of ¯rm i's output in sector s' output at time t. Double weighting makes productivity
indices more comparable across sectors. Labor productivity is calculated as lnLPi;t =
lnTFPi;t + ^ ¯K ki;t + ^ ¯S si;t + ^ ¯M mi;t ¡ (1 ¡ ^ ¯bl ¡ ^ ¯wh)(ln(Lbl
i;t + Lwh
i;t )).
27ing the 1990s. The present study is the ¯rst to employ an extensive ¯rm-level
sample. Most previous studies on Brazilian industry consider labor productiv-
ity. As ¯gure 5 shows, labor productivity increases more strongly than TFP
during the 1990s (from .986 to 1.053) because ¯rms raise their capital stock.
Some potential sources of mismeasurement in productivity change remain.
They a®ect the present ¯rm-level estimates but production function estimation
at higher aggregates would not necessarily mitigate them. First, if industry-
wide markups erode over time|with ® gradually approaching unity rather
than being ¯xed as the parsimonious model suggests|, then the TFP mea-
sure will increase too little or fall over time (even though the factor ® in front of
lnTFPi;t appears to indicate otherwise). The reason is that ® remains unmea-
sured in the time-invariant production coe±cient estimates and biases the av-
erage production coe±cients in (10) downward because early years with lower
® reduce the estimates. So, higher factor-input terms should be subtracted
from output particularly in the earlier years than are removed in fact. This
makes the ® ¢ lnTFPi;t measure increase too little or fall over time. Second, a
similar argument applies to economies of scale. If increasing returns are under-
stated, as is likely, smaller factor-input terms are subtracted from output than
should be removed. Productivity rises as output grows proportionally faster
than inputs so that the removal of downward biased factor-input terms will
make the TFP measure increase too little. On these accounts, the measured
productivity change may understate Brazil's productivity advancement.
6 Open Issues
The size of the bars in ¯gure 6 re°ects the estimates of economies of scale under
EOP (one pair of bars per sector). As is frequently the case in micro-data, the
sums of factor coe±cients exhibit, one exception notwithstanding, decreasing
returns to scale (totals range from .90 in (31) food and beverages to 1.05 in
(14) wood and furniture).
However, the correction for scale economies remains an open issue. As
opposed to the coe±cient estimates on log aggregate demand in Klette and
Griliches (1996) for Norwegian manufacturing ¯rms, where estimates ranged
between zero and unity, expectation-proxy estimation in the present frame-
work, with higher-order interactions, yields coe±cient estimates orders of mag-
nitude above unity. So, aggregate demand coe±cient estimates imply that
1¡® > 1, whereas the positive input coe±cient estimates require that ® > 0.
This contradictory ¯nding refutes the validity of aggregate demand as a su±-
cient proxy to measure price elasticity. In the ¯ve select sectors, the coe±cient
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Data: Pesquisa Industrial Annual 1986-1998
Expenditure shares: Intermediate goods expenditure per output; labor costs (in-
cluding salaries, social contributions and bene¯ts) and user costs of capital (includ-
ing depreciation, ¯nancing costs, and pre-tax pro¯ts) in non-intermediate goods
expenditures. Economies-of-scale estimate from sum of EOP coe±cients.
Figure 6: Factor shares from EOP estimates and crude expenditures
A coe±cient estimate for (1¡®) of 300, for instance, would imply a price elas-
ticity of demand (¡1=(1¡®)) of -.003, if measured correctly. So, price increases
would lead to hardly any demand reductions and manufacturers could wield
substantial pricing power.8 The magnitudes appear unreasonable and call for
the development of a di®erent scale-correction method. The theoretical model
of endogenous e±ciency choice suggests that ¯rms' procyclical investments in
productivity improvement are the likely reason for the high coe±cient esti-
mates on log aggregate demand.
Figure 6 also points to peculiarities in the composition of relative factor
shares in ¯rm-level expenditure and production. The surprising discrepancies
raise several questions for further research. The left bar in each sector pair
shows the EOP coe±cient estimates, the right bar the expenditure shares (the
height of the right bar is set equal to the sum of EOP coe±cients). On av-
erage across sectors, the sum of (Cobb-Douglas) EOP capital coe±cients is
less than a quarter of the sum of labor coe±cients. This is a low ratio but
would not be substantially higher with OLS estimation even in sectors with a
8However, the markup 1=® in the present theory model is not well de¯ned for price
elasticities of demand larger than ¡1 (smaller than 1 in absolute value).
29positive bias in capital coe±cients. While blue and white-collar labor coe±-
cients in EOP estimation sum to roughly 60 percent in the select ¯ve sectors,
the share of labor-related costs (salaries, social contributions and bene¯ts) in
total ¯rm-level expenditures (excluding water and electricity) falls below 20
percent in three out of ¯ve sectors. On the other hand, expenditure shares
of intermediate goods and user costs of capital (depreciation, ¯nancing costs,
and pre-tax pro¯ts) as a share of total expenditure account for a substantially
larger portion of factor incomes than production coe±cients on intermediate
goods and the sum of the equipment and structures coe±cients would suggest.
(The machinery sector (08) su®ers considerable losses over the sample period;
these losses account for the small share of capital in factor incomes in that
sector.)
Several reasons, some speci¯c to the Brazilian context, may lie behind
these surprising disproportions. First, while production function coe±cients
are estimated at the sample mean, ¯rm heterogeneity may distort expenditure
shares away from marginal products of the mean ¯rm. Second, gains from
under-represented returns to scale likely accrue more to capital owners than
to workers, boosting the expenditure share on capital beyond its marginal
product. Third, real money-market interest rates of above forty percent are
common in Brazil during the sampling period. If ¯rms reduce their capital-
output ratios less than proportionally (less than ¯K=(¯L+¯M) under Cobb-
Douglas)|in expectation of more adequate future interest rates, for instance|
then capital-cost expenditures exceed the marginal product of capital. Fourth,
¯nancing costs also accrue on capital that is not invested in ¯xed assets so that
¯nancial expenditure shares are naturally larger than production coe±cients on
capital. Finally, remaining measurement error in the capital stock series could
bias the probability limits of the capital coe±cients towards zero, whereas head
counts of workers arguably su®er less measurement error. An investigation into
the exact causes of the detected discrepancies between production coe±cients
and expenditure shares remains a task for future research.
7 Conclusion
Managements seek to streamline processes and improve e±ciency, they invest
in productivity-relevant assets and activities, and thus respond to individ-
ual market prospects. A large body of recent empirical evidence con¯rms that
product-market competition tends to exert discipline on managers and to instill
investment in process innovations (Tybout et al. 1991, Levinsohn 1993, Tybout
and Westbrook 1995, Nickell 1996, Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Pavcnik 2002).
This suggests that a superior proxy to productivity choice may be ¯rm-level
30investment interacted with sector-level competition variables such as, for in-
stance, foreign market penetration.
From this general insight derives an estimation framework. For simplic-
ity, it builds on a q-theory model of investment in capital and productivity
under convex adjustment costs. The model implies that ¯rms set investment
schedules so that capital and productivity rise or decay simultaneously. So,
variables that characterize a ¯rm's competitive environment, interacted with
the ¯rm's individual investment, are suitable proxies to endogenous produc-
tivity choice. Apart from the choice of proxies, the theoretical model gives rise
to an estimation framework similar to Olley and Pakes (1996).
The new proxies resolve the empirical puzzle that ¯xed-e®ects estimators
frequently and sharply disagree with all other estimators. This repeated ¯nding
suggests the presence of a persistent within-¯rm but time-varying shock that
is correlated with inputs. Under the present framework, however, coe±cient
estimates for equipment and structures coincide with those from ¯xed-e®ects
estimation. So, the untreated shock that troubled prior estimators appears to
be the ¯rm-level assessment of individual business prospects and the resulting
¯rm-level e±ciency response to the competitive environment.
Applied to a sample of medium-sized to large Brazilian manufacturing com-
panies between 1986 and 1998, the proposed expectations proxies improve the
precision of estimates and the convergence properties. Absent a correction
for survival likelihoods in the shorter Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure,
both the expectations-proxy and the intermediate-inputs proxy would ¯nd cap-
ital and intermediate goods coe±cients that are lower than OLS (a surprising
positive bias, though consistent with aspects of the theory). However, when
explicitly accounting for ¯rms' survival likelihoods, the extended Olley and
Pakes algorithm ¯nds and mitigates a commonly expected negative bias in
OLS capital coe±cients for several sectors. Most importantly, the use of ¯rm-
level investments interacted with sector-level competition measures as proxies
to productivity yield estimates that closely resemble ¯xed-e®ects estimates.
So, competition measures joined by ¯rm-level investment appear to remove
the often suspected ¯rm-speci¯c time-variant e®ect that used to distort pro-
duction function estimates. The procedure seems to be successful in removing
two common biases that a®ect production coe±cients in micro-data: A `sur-
vivor bias', induced through exits that depend on ¯rm-level productivity, and
a `transmission bias' that arises because physical investment is correlated with
¯rm-level productivity.
These advances notwithstanding, open issues remain to resolve. Coe±cient
estimates on log sector-wide demand, a further competition proxy, are high
and appear to capture ¯rms' e±ciency choice rather than an omitted price
31e®ect. This limits Klette and Griliches' (1996) proposed correction method
for `omitted price bias.' The `omitted price bias' stems from the fact that
price is unobserved in revenues but endogenous under imperfect competition so
that a demand-side factor scales down production-function coe±cients jointly
and causes underestimated economies of scale. The lacking treatment of scale
economies in the present framework may also lie behind unresolved discrep-
ancies between input coe±cient estimates and factor shares in ¯rm-level ex-
penditure. Gains from under-represented returns to scale likely accrue more
to capital owners than to workers, boosting the expenditure share on capi-
tal beyond its marginal product. Moreover, ¯rm heterogeneity may distort
expenditure shares away from marginal products of the mean ¯rm. Finally,
changing but untreated markups may a®ect ¯rm-level productivity estimates.
Empirical investigations into the exact causes of the detected discrepancies
between production coe±cients and expenditure shares, and into time-varying
markups, remain important tasks for future research.
32Appendix
A Behavioral Framework
This appendix presents a behavioral framework, to incorporate the frequent empiri-
cal ¯nding that e±ciency choice and managerial e®orts respond to market conditions.
According implications for estimation under `selection bias,' `transmission bias,' and
`omitted price bias' are derived. Table 1 in the text provides an overview of the main
ingredients and the implications of the model.
Firms invest in both capital goods and productivity-relevant assets. The model
provides a production-side explanation why the bias in OLS capital coe±cients may
be positive. The model motivates a variant of Olley and Pakes' estimation procedure.
The model implies that observations with non-positive investment need not be drop-
ped from the sample. The model also implies that, rather than intermediate goods as
in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), investment interacted with sector-level competition
variables is the most suitable productivity proxy. The model incorporates a partial
Klette and Griliches' (1996) correction method. Optimality conditions are derived
using principal-agent and q-theory and underly most estimation equations. Market
clearing, on the other hand, is only needed for the derivation of the partial Klette
and Griliches' (1996) correction method. Two testable implications of the proposed
model are that the productivity level and the capital stock are positively correlated
among survivors, and that productivity should be procyclical. Both implications are
borne out in the present data.
A.1 Assumptions
Firms invest in two state variables, capital and e±ciency-relevant assets. There
are several °ow variables. Besides investment, which moves the two state variables,
¯rms employ labor and use intermediate goods.
The variable ­i;t is the total of a ¯rm's tacit knowledge, organizational skills, and
e±ciency-relevant arrangements embodied in the production process. All of these
factors contribute to a ¯rms' TFP level. They are not transferrable from one ¯rm
to another but can be accumulated within a ¯rm. They depreciate unless cultivated
with investment I­
i;t+1. For simplicity, TFP is assumed to be
TFPi;t = (­i;t)º (A.1)
for some coe±cient º >0. As opposed to physical capital accumulation, there is a






¢ ~ xi;t. (A.2)
The parameter ±­ expresses the depreciation rate of organizational knowledge. Pro-
ductivity choice is an imperfect substitute for physical capital because (­i;t)º will
33enter the production function separately and a ¯rm cannot anticipate the realization
xi;t. The stochastic factor ~ xi;t captures a ¯rm's e±ciency and is assumed to be un-
correlated with its past realizations and factor inputs|similar to the spirit of Olley
and Pakes' (1996) model. However, the e®orts of a ¯rm's management to improve
e±ciency and make better use of organizational skills can a®ect the distribution of
~ xi;t favorably (more on this in section A.3).
Consider a market with monopolistic competition. Each ¯rm manufactures one
variety of a good. Consumers have income Yt and preferences as in a standard
model for intraindustry trade: u(Z1;:::ZN;C) = (µ=®)ln(
PN
n=1(Zn)®)+(1¡µ)lnC.
There are N varieties of good Z. Under this utility, price elasticity of demand for
a modern good i is approximately ¡1=(1¡®) and results in a markup factor of 1=®




n;t ]¡(1¡®)=®, similar to











where £t is the disposable income that domestic consumers spend on goods Z,
including imports. This will be a key relationship for the correction of endogenous
price in sales (Klette and Griliches 1996).
To see more clearly how foreign competition a®ects demand, suppose that do-
mestic varieties of a good sell at about the same price. However, there is a possibly
di®erent world market price P
f
t for foreign varieties that compete with ¯rm i's good.


























t denote the number of domestic and foreign varieties, respectively.
Their ratio is a measure of foreign market penetration. Demand for a domestic
¯rm's variety increases when there are relatively fewer foreign competitors, or when
foreign price is higher, tari®s are higher, or the exchange rate is more favorable|as
one would expect.
9The precise price elasticity of demand is










giving rise to a markup pi;t ' 1
®MCi;t over marginal cost MC.
10See Muendler (2002, equation (2.27)).
34A.2 A ¯rm's price, factor, and investment choice
Boone (2000) shows conditions when more competition provides incentives to inno-
vate products or processes. The present model is more modest. Based on textbooks
theories of monopolistic competition and investment under convex adjustment costs,
its main objective is to provide an estimation framework that is consistent with
endogenous productivity choice and that can be related to previously introduced
estimation procedures by Olley and Pakes (1996), Klette and Griliches (1996), and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
A monopolist in the market for good Z sets price and chooses the variable factors
in every period t, given his capital stock and TFP. The production technology for
variety i of good Z is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
Zi;t = (­i;t)º(Ki;t)1¡¯(Li;t ¡ L0)¯, (A.5)
where (­i;t)º is TFP. Li;t denotes employment, the only variable factor for now. L0
is a ¯xed labor input needed in every period to keep the ¯rm in operation. It gives
rise to monopolistic competition in equilibrium.
Consider a ¯rm's intertemporal choice of its capital stock and organizational
knowledge, and whether to continue in business or to shutdown. If the ¯rm exits, it
receives a payment ©t for its remaining assets. Tomorrow's capital stock is certain,
Ki;t+1 = Ki;t(1¡±K)+IK
i;t+1, whereas tomorrow's organizational knowledge is partly
random and given by (A.2). Investments IK
i;t+1 and I­
i;t+1 are decided at the end of
period t, result in an immediate cash out°ow but become a®ective only in period t+1.
Adjustment costs for organizational knowledge, Ã­(I­
i;t+1)2=(2­i;t), are quadratic as
in a textbook model of Tobin's q. Similarly, adjustment costs for the capital stock
are ÃK(IK
i;t+1)2=(2Ki;t). Then the Bellman equation becomes



























where R ´ 1 + r is the real interest factor and Fi;t a ¯rm's information set at time
t. General market conditions, such as foreign market penetration, enter the decision
through their e®ect on price. Each monopolist takes into account that higher supply
depresses price given the demand schedule (A.4). So, a monopolist sees price as a





t ;¿t;£t) stands for the vector
of current market conditions that ¯rm i faces. Price elasticity of demand ¡1=(1¡®)
is constant, however, and independent of Dt.
First, consider the case of a ¯rm that continues in business. Tobin's q's for




















Then, the ¯rst-order conditions for the Bellman equation (A.6) imply that
q­




i;t = 1 + ÃK IK
i;t+1
Ki;t





Di®erentiating the value function with respect to the current state variable ­i;t and





















by (A.7) and the envelope theorem. An according condition applies to Tobin's q for
physical capital.















































A ¯rm is uncertain about the realization of both future TFP and market conditions.
The two terms in the expectations operator re°ect the value of the respective state
variable given market prospects ®P¤(Zi;s;Ds)Zi;s and savings in future adjustment
costs (IK
i;s+1)2=(Ki;s)2. So, market conditions a®ect the value of both state variables
in a very similar way.
As a consequence, the model implies that a ¯rm's capital stock and organiza-
tional knowledge are correlated from a researcher's perspective. By (A.8) and (A.2),




Ã­ + (1 ¡ ±­)
#
. (A.12)
An according condition holds for Ki;t. So, for the researcher, the correlation between
TFP and capital becomes









36For the ¯rm, q­
i;t and qK
i;t are certain, given its information. The correlation is zero
from its point of view. The researcher, on the other hand, does not know a ¯rm's
information set. Therefore, the data will exhibit a correlation between capital and
TFP. The correlation is likely to be positive since future revenues a®ect both q­
i;t
and qK








































conditional on survival. De
t ´ Et[fD0
sgs=t;:::;1]0 is the vector of current and future
market conditions as expected at time t. A positive bias in OLS capital coe±cients
is frequently found in micro-data, refuting prior models that cannot account for this
possibility.11
However, since there is exit from the sample, the correlation in (A.13) does not
give the complete picture. In general, the shutdown rule for a ¯rm depends on the
¯rm's state variables and its information about revenue prospects. Since the value
function is increasing in both state variables, there are lower threshold levels for the
states below which a ¯rm exits, given market prospects. Alternatively, the shutdown
rule can be written as a function of the realization of the TFP innovation. After








where Âi;t+1 = 0 means that ¯rm i chooses to shutdown at the end of period t. If
the value of current and discounted future pro¯ts falls short of the outside value ©t,
the ¯rm has no incentive to produce in the current or any future period. Since the
value function (A.6) is strictly increasing in the capital stock,12 the threshold level
11It is sometimes argued that a positive productivity shock may push demand for a ¯rm's
good more than proportionally and thus capital input, giving rise to a positive correlation
through demand rather than production e®ects. In a model of the present structure but with
productivity beyond a ¯rm's control, an exogenous productivity shock translates one to one
into an output change with no e®ect on input choice. Very speci¯c assumptions on demand
elasticity could allow a positive productivity shock to cause a more than proportional output
increase and higher capital input. But temporary productivity shocks hardly a®ect capital
input even under such strong assumptions.
12@V (¢)=@Ki;t = ®(1¡¯)P¤(¢)tZi;t=Ki;t+(1¡±K)qK
i;t+ÃK(IK
i;t+1)2=(2Ki;t) > 0. Estimates
of exit probabilities from the second stage of the estimation algorithm con¯rm that capital-
rich ¯rms are less likely to exit.
37x(¢) is strictly decreasing in Ki;t. A capital-rich ¯rm is willing to bear lower TFP
levels and still continues in business.
As Olley and Pakes (1996) point out, this introduces a negative correlation be-
tween the capital stock of survivors and the expected TFP level. Call the probability















for the researcher. At the lower bound on xi;t+1, x(­i;t;I­
i;t+1;Ki;t+1;Dt+1), the ¯rm
is indi®erent between staying in business and exiting. The bound strictly decreases
in the capital stock Ki;t+1. Thus, the value of the integral will be the lower the higher
the capital stock happens to be. In the data, a negative relation between capital and
the expected TFP level is likely to result. It is not clear a priori whether a positive
correlation from (A.13) would outweigh the negative bias from (A.17) or not. The
present data detect positive biases in OLS capital coe±cients for some sectors, and
negative biases for others. In general, a negative bias in the frequently surprisingly
low OLS capital coe±cients is suspected.
A.3 Competition and a manager's e±ciency choice
Product-market competition can induce managers to resolve agency problems and to
remove managerial slack. Hermalin (1992) and Schmidt (1997) present theoretical
circumstances when increasing competition forces ¯rms to reduce agency problems
and managerial slack. Though lacking the completeness of Hermalin (1992) and
Schmidt (1997), a slight extension of the present model can incorporate these insights
and help clarify further implications for productivity estimation.
A ¯rm's investment in organizational skills I­
i;t+1 is observable to the ¯rm's owner
through cash °ows. Similarly, ­i;t can be inferred from output. However, the man-
ager's e®orts in employing these organizational skills are not known. Successful
e®orts a®ect the distribution of the productivity shock ~ xi;t in (A.2) favorably. In
other words, e±ciency improving investments are only successful if the management
subsequently makes good use of the changes. This gives rise to moral hazard. Sup-
pose that a manager can either choose high e®orts or low e®orts (Ei;t 2 feH
i;t;eL
i;tg)
and that the distribution of xi;t+1jeH
i;t stochastically dominates the distribution
xi;t+1jeL
i;t.13 Under the assumption that e®orts only a®ect next year's productiv-
ity xi;t+1 » f(xi;t+1jEi;t), it is easy to see that the ¯rm's owner bases the optimal
13Second-order dominance is assumed for º < 1. A mean-preserving spread leaves the
¯rm-¯xed e®ect ¯0;i unchanged.
38(end-of-year) remuneration w(¢) on the observation of xi;t+1. The owner maximizes
V (­i;t;Ki;t) ¡ (1=R)E[w(xi;t+1)] given the risk averse manager's participation con-




















It is straight forward to use the principal's ¯rst-order conditions and show that the
optimal remuneration for the manager is strictly increasing in xi;t+1 if and only if
the likelihood ratio f(xi;t+1jeH
i;t)=f(xi;t+1jeL
i;t) is strictly increasing in xi;t+1. Suppose
this is the case.
Fiercer competition raises x(¢;Dt+1) and ¯rms go out of business more frequently.
Hermalin (1992) and Schmidt (1997) show that high-e®ort contracts can but need
not become easier to institute under ¯ercer competition. A similar ambiguity arises
here but for di®erent reasons. Note that the likelihood ratio is increasing in xi;t+1 and
hence in x, but the ratio (1¡F(xjeH
i;t)=(1¡F(xjeL
i;t) is also increasing in x. Together,
these facts can but need not make the left-hand side in (A.18) grow larger relative
to the right-hand side under ¯ercer competition and may facilitate the institution of
high-e®ort contracts. Irrespective of whether competition has a positive or negative
e®ect on e±ciency, productivity estimation can account for it by controlling for the
competitive conditions in which a ¯rm operates.
B The Pesquisa Industrial Anual Sample
The Brazilian statistical bureau (IBGE) conducts an annual survey of mining and
manufacturing ¯rms, called Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA). It comprises a sample
of formally established, medium-sized to large Brazilian ¯rms for the years 1986 to
1990, 1992 to 1995, and 1996 to the present.Mining is disregarded in this paper.
Muendler (2003) documents the construction of an unbalanced panel data set
from PIA in detail|including the establishment of longitudinal relations between
¯rms (such as entry, creation, exit, and mergers or acquisitions), consistency ad-
justments for economic variables due to questionnaire changes, price de°ation of
the economic variables, and the derivation of consistent capital stock series. This
appendix merely summarizes the resulting data characteristics.
A ¯rm quali¯es for PIA if at least half of its revenues stem from manufacturing
activity and if it is formally registered with the Brazilian tax authorities. In 1986,
the initial PIA sample was constructed from three layers: (1) A non-random sample
of the largest Brazilian manufacturers with output corresponding to at least 200
million Reais in 1995 (around 200 million US dollars in 1995). There were roughly
39800 of them. (2) A random sample among medium-sized ¯rms whose annual output
in 1985 exceeded a value corresponding to R$ 100,000 in 1995 (around USD 100,000
in 1995). More than 6,900 ¯rms made it into PIA this way. (3) A non-random
selection of newly founded ¯rms. PIA only included new ¯rms that surpassed an
annual average employment level of at least 100 persons. The inclusion process ended
in 1993, however. Until then, around 1,800 ¯rms were identi¯ed in this manner.
Departing from its initial 1986 sample, PIA identi¯es more than 9,500 active
¯rms over the years. A ¯rm that ever enters PIA through one of the selection
criteria remains in the sample unless it is legally extinct. Moreover, if an existing
¯rm in PIA reports the creation of a new ¯rm as a subsidiary or spin-o®, or a merger,
this new ¯rm enters PIA too. No sample was taken in 1991 due to a federal austerity
program. The sampling method changed in 1996, and no capital stock ¯gures are
reported since. Therefore, the dataset of this paper only embraces ¯rms after 1995
that were present in PIA earlier or that were longitudinally related to an earlier
¯rm. Their capital stock is inferred with a perpetual inventory method. Following
the change in sampling, there is a drop in the sample in 1996. Tests at various
stages of the estimation prove it to be exogenous. Table 7 documents sample exit
and sample attrition for the ¯ve largest sectors in PIA, on which most of the present
analysis is based.
Output and domestic inputs are de°ated with sector-speci¯c price indices (con-
structed on the basis of Brazilian wholesale price indices and input-output matrices).
Capital stock ¯gures and investments are de°ated with economy-wide price indices
(constructed on the basis of Brazilian wholesale price indices and economy-wide
capital formation vectors). Two steps are used to de°ate foreign equipment acquisi-
tions and foreign intermediate inputs. First, sector-speci¯c series of import-weighted
foreign producer prices, adjusted for nominal exchange rate °uctuations relative to
the US-Dollar, are applied. Then, (investment-weighted) nominal tari®s on foreign
machinery and (sector-speci¯c input-weighted) nominal tari®s on intermediates are
removed from equipment acquisitions and intermediate inputs.
To check for sensitivity, the data were de°ated with three di®erent price indices.
The sector-speci¯c wholesale price index IPA-OG underlies all results in this paper.
Another sector-speci¯c wholesale price index, IPA-DI (excluding imports), and the
economy-wide price index IGP-DI (a combined wholesale and consumer price index)
do not yield substantially di®erent results. There is no producer price index for
Brazil.
The overall capital stock is inferred under a perpetual inventory method that
controls for changes to accounting law in 1991. Both investments and book values
of capital goods are reported in PIA until 1995. Investments are assumed to become
productive parts of the capital stock within the year of their reporting. They are used
to infer typical depreciation rates through regression analysis. Foreign equipment
levels are inferred from foreign equipment acquisitions and overall retirements. The
structures part in total capital includes rented capital goods. These stocks of rented
capital goods are inferred from reported rental rates, which are taken to equal the

















Data: Pesquisa Industrial Annual 1986-1998. Sectors:
(08) Machinery, (14) Wood and furniture, (22) Textiles,
(26) Plant products, (31) Other food and beverages.
(time-varying) user cost of capital. Consistency adjustments are made under the
perpetual inventory method when stock changes are observed that di®er from net
investments (di®erent de°ators can cause this). Usually, simple averages are used.
Since sector-wide depreciation rates are applied, the resulting capital stock series for
1986-1998 are smoother across ¯rms and over time than the raw series.
Sector classi¯cations in PIA would allow for the estimation of production func-
tions at a level that corresponds to three ISIC rev. 3 digits (n¶ ³vel 100). However,
large ¯rms in PIA are likely to o®er product ranges beyond narrowly de¯ned sec-
tor limits. Data at more aggregate levels also provide more variation in the cross
section because market penetration and tari® series then become available for two
or more subsectors within several sectors. Moreover, switching from the three to
the two-digit level increases the number of observations for productivity estimation
considerably. So, estimations are carried out at the ISIC rev. 3 two-digit level (n¶ ³vel
50).
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